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HUGHES v. STATE: THE "BORN ALIVE" RULE
DIES A TIMELY DEATH
It must be true that whenever a sensational murder is committed
there are people who-though they are, quite properly, of no inter-
est to law enforcers, attorneys, or newspaper reporters-weep, lie
sleepless, and realize at last that their lives have been changed by a
crime in which they played no part.'
I. INTRODUCTION
May a person be convicted of homicide2 for inflicting injuries on
an unborn child who died from the injuries before birth? After a re-
cent decision by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the answer
in Oklahoma is an unequivocal "YES."3 The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals is the third4 and most recent state court to expressly
reject the "Born Alive" Rule and hold that a viable human fetus is a
"human being" against whom a homicide may be committed.5 While
still in the minority, Oklahoma has recognized that technological ad-
vances in medical science have abolished the need for the "Born
Alive" Rule.6
Criminal liability for the death of a fetus remains a powerfully
debated area, but existing protections for the unborn under the crimi-
nal law are very limited.7 The majority of jurisdictions does not recog-
nize the unborn as persons entitled to the protection of the criminal
1. THm QUOTABLE LAWYER 225 (David Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986) (quoting
VINA DELMAR, THE BECKER ScANDAL (1968)).
2. Homicide is defined as the killing of one human being by the act, procurement, or omis-
sion of another. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently causes the death of another human being. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaugh-
ter or negligent homicide. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 734 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 736 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
4. The other two states that have expressly rejected the born alive rule are South Carolina
and Massachusetts. See State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467
N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984). Kansas also appears to have rejected the born alive rule without
discussion. See State v. Burrell, 699 P.2d 499 (Kan. 1985).
5. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 734, 736.
6. Id. at 732; see also People v. Guthrie, 334 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Mich. 1983) (Ryan, J., dis-
senting) ("Since the reason for the existence of the born alive rule has vanished-the impossibil-
ity of proving the humanness of the viable unborn-the rule should likewise vanish.").
7. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (Mass. 1984).
On the other hand, civil law has afforded protections to the unborn in a variety of ways. At
common law the fetus was given certain property rights. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d
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law.8 A few states, however, have enacted separate feticide statutes to
protect the unborn from homicide, 9 and the unborn are expressly in-
cluded in the coverage of the general homicide statutes in a few other
jurisdictions.10
In Hughes v. State," the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
overturned the "Born Alive" Rule.'2 The court concluded that viabil-
ity rather than live birth was a better standard for ascribing criminal
liability for the death of a fetus.' 3 Consequently, after Hughes a homi-
cide action for the death of a viable fetus will be proper in Oklahoma,
even if there was no subsequent live birth.' 4
This Note discusses the history of the "Born Alive" Rule and
modem advances in medical technology that affect the rationale be-
hind the "Born Alive" Rule. In addition, the decisions of the other
state courts that have rejected the "Born Alive" Rule are examined.
Finally, this Note explores the Hughes decision and considers the im-
pact it will have on society and criminal prosecutions in Oklahoma.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE "BORN ALivE" RULE
The "Born Alive" Rule is a rule of medical jurisprudence pro-
duced by the limitations on medical knowledge available to the com-
mon law from the 16th through 19th centuries.'- Given the primitive
knowledge of life in the womb, live birth was an evidentiary standard
617, 629-30 (Cal. 1970). Modem tort law has recognized the right of a fetus to recover damages
for prenatal injuries, if the fetus survives. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 367-70 (5th ed. 1984). There is also a recent trend permitting recov-
ery for wrongful death when the fetus dies as a result of prenatal injuries. See Barbara E. Lingle,
Comment, Allowing Fetal Wrongful Death Actions in Arkansas: A Death Whose Time Has
Come?, 44 ARK. L. REv. 465, 466 n.6 (1991).
8. Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1327.
9. See, e.g., IOWA CODE AN. § 707.7 (West 1993) ("Feticide-any person who intention-
ally terminates a human pregnancy after the end of the second trimester of the pregnancy where
death of the fetus results commits feticide."); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1992) (defining feticide
as the willful killing of a quickened child by an act injuring the mother that would be murder if
the mother died).
10. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00, 125.05 (McKinney 1987) (stating that homicide includes
certain abortional acts, all defined to include the intent to cause a miscarriage); CAL. PENAL
CODE §187 (West 1988) (defining murder as the unlawful killing of a human being, or fetus, with
malice aforethought).
11. 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
12. Id at 736.
13. Id at 732-33.
14. Id at 736.
15. Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child-? The BORN ALIVE RULE and
Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 563, 571 (1987).
[Vol. 30:539
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required to prove that the unborn child was alive.16 The resulting evi-
dentiary limitations led to the quickening doctrine and the "Born
Alive" Rule. 17
Quickening is the first physical movement that is felt by the
mother of the fetus in the womb.' It was at this point that it could be
proved that the mother was pregnant.' 9 It also could be established
that the child was alive in utero. ° Before quickening, therefore, it
was virtually impossible for anyone, including the woman, a midwife,
or a physician, to confidently know of a pregnancy or a live child.2 '
As a result, the common law adopted the quickening doctrine as a
presumption that the child was first "endowed with life" at
quickening.22
This primitive knowledge of human life in the womb explained
the rationale for the "Born Alive" Rule. Even after quickening, it was
exceptionally difficult to determine whether the child died prior to or
during labor and subsequent expulsion from the womb.3 As a result,
live birth24 was required to prove that the unborn child was alive and
that the tortious acts ultimately caused death.2 Without live birth, it
could not be established that the child was alive in the womb at the
time of the defendant's acts.26
By the seventeenth century, the English common law fully em-
braced the "Born Alive" Rule, and the Rule was reported and advo-
cated by Sir Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone. 27 Considering
the tremendous influence of Coke and Blackstone on early American
common law, it is not surprising that American courts uniformly
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 567.
19. Id. at 568.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 573.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Any expulsion of the fetus from the womb showing evidence of life is called a live birth.
Id. at 568. A child is considered alive if the child has an independent life of its own for some
period, even momentarily, after birth, as evidenced by respiration or other indications of life,
such as beating of heart and pulsation of arteries or heart tones in response to artificial respira-
tion, or pulsation of umbilical cord after being severed. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 74 (6th ed.
1990).
Oklahoma has enacted a "live birth" definition virtually identical to this definition. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-301(e) (1991).
25. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 575.
26. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 575.
27. See Sm EDWARD COKE, INsTTErEs OF TmE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (1648); 4 SIR WIL-
LIAM BLAcKs-roNE, COZMNTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 198 (1765 ed.) (U. of Chi. Press
Facsimile 1979).
1995]
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adopted the "Born Alive" Rule during the nineteenth century. 28 In
fact, by 1850 the English common-law rule "had long been accepted in
the United States."29
III. MODERN-DAY ADVANCEs IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
Medical knowledge of fetal development has increased at a star-
tling pace in recent years3 The growth of medical technology has
forced courts to reexamine the legal status of the fetus. Although
American courts invariably adopted the "Born Alive" Rule without
examining its purpose, scholars generally attribute the rule to the
technological inability to prove the corpus delicti of the homicide of an
unborn child.31 The courts are using a rule that is "generally under-
stood to derive from the impossibility of determining whether and
when a fetus was living and when and how it died."' 32 As a result,
American courts are using an antiquated law that is over 300 years
old.
Although medical science was unable to establish conclusively
the existence of a live fetus or the cause of an unborn child's death
until the middle of the twentieth century, recent.advances in medical
technology make these determinations routine.33 With recent ad-
vances in embryology and medical technology, physicians can estab-
lish the existence and gestational age of a live fetus by fetal heart
28. Several American courts cited Coke and Blackstone in support of the Born Alive Rule.
Clarke v. State, 23 So. 671, 674 (Ala. 1898); State v. Cooper, 22 NJ.L. 52, 54 (1849).
29. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1970).
30. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 576.
31. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 576.
32. People v. Guthrie, 334 N.W.2d 616, 617 (Mich. 1983).
33. F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICs 267 (18th ed. 1989). "Birth itself
is no longer a violent perilous adventure. Current statistics indicate that the fetal survival rate
after twenty weeks of gestation is ninety-nine percent." People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775,778
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980), pet. for leave to appeal denied, 334 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. 1983).
[Vol. 30:539
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monitoring, sonography, amniocentesis, and other techniques.34 Med-
ical experts can now also establish the point at which a fetus is via-
ble,35 as well as the proximate cause of a fetal death.36
Despite these medical advances, the "Born Alive" Rule continues
to dominate American law regarding the homicide of fetuses, regard-
less of their gestational development.37 During the 1980's, many state
courts applied the rule to prohibit homicide convictions for the deaths
of viable fetuses in the face of occasionally gruesome facts and despite
the high degree of culpability of some defendants.38
IV. APPLICATION OF THE "BORN ALivE" RULE BY AMiERICAN
COURTS
Today, despite the significant advances in our understanding of
the human unborn, twenty-four states still adhere to the "Born Alive"
Rule by court decision.39 In at least eleven cases involving the "Born
34. CUNNrNGHAm Er AL., supra note 33, at 19-20.
35. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,514-15,530-31 (1989) (uphold-
ing a Missouri statute creating a presumption of viability that must be rebutted by medical tests
before an abortion may be performed).
Viability is an arbitrary standard, which varies from case to case. David A. Gordon, The
Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MicH. L. REv. 579, 588-97 (1965). Whether a fetus is capable of living will
depend upon any number of factors, including the health of its mother and the general state of
medical science. Green v. Smith, 377 N.E.2d 37 (Ill. 1978) (finding that court was unable to hold
as a matter of law that a fourteen-week-old fetus which weighed less than 120 grams was non-
viable); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250,1252 (Il. 1977) (stating that "in addition
to the length of pregnancy, viability depends on other facts which include the weight... of the
child and the available life-sustaining techniques."). However, viability has no medical reality
because of these factors. The legal reality of viability developed out of historical need to explain
that a fetus exists as a being separate from its mother. See Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 502-
03 (NJ. 1960).
36. This can be done with the aid of fetal autopsies. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467
N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. 1989); State v. Trudell, 755
P.2d 511, 512 (Kan. 1988).
37. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 595-96.
38. See, eg., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (involving a defendant that
shoved his knee into his pregnant ex-wife's abdomen while stating, "I'm going to stomp it out of
you"); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983) (involving a defendant that forced his
hand up his wife's vagina killing the child and substantially damaging the mother's uterus and
vagina); In re A.W.S., 440 A.2d 1174 (NJ. 1980) (involving the death of a fetus three days before
its expected full-term delivery by a reckless driver).
39. Singleton v. State, 35 So. 2d 375 (Ala. 1948); Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d 584 (Ark.
1987); State v. Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156 (Conn. 1986); State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); White v. State, 232 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1977); State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519
(1876); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983); People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980), pet. for leave to appeal denied, 334 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. 1983); Taylor v.
State, 66 So. 321 (Miss. 1914); State v. Doyle, 287 N.W.2d 59 (Neb. 1980); In re A.W.S., 440 A.2d
1144 (NJ. 1981); State v. Willis, 652 P.2d 1222 (N.M. 1982); People v. Hayner, 90 N.E.2d 23
(N.Y. 1949); State v. Sogge, 161 N.W. 1022 (N.D. 1917); State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599
(Ohio 1971); State v. McKee, 1 Add. 1 (Pa. 1791); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982);
Morgan v. State, 256 S.W. 433 (Tenn. 1923); Harris v. State, 12 S.W. 1102 (Tex. 1889); State v.
5
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Alive" Rule, courts applied the Rule despite medical evidence indicat-
ing the cause of fetal death.4' Furthermore, even in those jurisdictions
that have abandoned the live-birth requirement in the tort context,
courts continue to apply the "Born Alive" Rule in homicide cases.
These courts typically note this inconsistency, but dismiss it with little
hesitation, often pointing out that remedial statutes are to be con-
strued liberally, whereas criminal statutes are governed by a rule of
strict construction.41 Nevertheless, courts in two states42 have aban-
doned the rule, while others have abandoned the rule to some extent
by statute.43
A reason often cited by the courts for retaining the "Born Alive"
Rule is that a retroactive application of a homicide statute to encom-
pass the particular child before the court would violate the constitu-
tional guarantee against undue surprise afforded criminal defendants
by the due process clause.4' The first essential of due process is fair
warning of the act which is made punishable as a crime.45 These
courts maintain that the application of a homicide statute to the killing
Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978); Lane v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 781 (Va. 1978); State ex
rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1984); Huebner v. State 111 N.W. 63 (Wis. 1907);
Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963).
40. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 618 (Cal. 1970); State v. Anonymous, 516
A.d 156,157 (Conn. 1986); People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203,206 (Ill 1980); State v. Trudell, 755
P.2d 511, 512 (Kan. 1988); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 61-62 (Ky. 1983); People v.
Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775, 776 (Mich. CL App. 1980), pet. for leave to appeal denied, 334 N.W.2d
616 (Mich. 1983); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Minn. 1985); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1
(N.C. 1989); State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599, 600 (Ohio 1971); State v. Evans, 745 S.W.2d
880, 881 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah 1978).
41. See State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 2 n.3, 4 (N.C. 1989); see also People v. Greer, 402
N.E.2d 203, 209 (IlI. 1980) ("Differing objectives and considerations in tort and criminal law
foster ... different principles governing the same factual situation."); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d
625, 630 (Mian. 1985) ("This court may... fashion a remedy for civil wrong... but is forbidden
to use its common law power to fashion crimes for public wrong."); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d
1257, 1259 (LI. 1982) (holding wrongful death statute was "properly subject to a liberal applica-
tion," but homicide statute must "be narrowly construed").
42. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989) (including viable fetus as
"person" for purpose of common-law crime of murder); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d
1324 (Mass. 1984) (construing vehicular homicide statue to encompass killing of viable fetus);
State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984) (extending common-law definition of murder to in-
clude viable fetus).
43. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 187(a) (West 1988) (defining murder as "the unlawful killing of
a human being or a fetus, with malice aforethought"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1.2
(Smith-Hurd 1994) (creating the crime of "Intentional homicide of an unborn child"); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-268 (West 1987 and Supp. 1995) (establishing separate, comprehensive
homicide statutes encompassing unborn children).
44. Keeler v. Superior Ct., 470 P.2d 617, 625-26 (Cal. 1970); State v. Anonymous, 516 A.2d
156, 159 (Conn. 1986); State v. Trudell, 755 P.2d 511, 516 (Kan. 1988); State v. Willis, 652 P.2d
1222, 1223 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
45. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 626.
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of an unborn child could not be foreseen by the offender and would
violate the criminal defendant's right to due process.46
The due process rationale as applied to a homicide statute for the
killing of an unborn child is incorrect and should be criticized. The
application of a homicide statute to the death of an unborn viable
fetus does not violate a criminal defendant's fair warning and certainly
does not justify retaining the "Born Alive" Rule under such circum-
stances.47 The proper inquiry at stake in the "fair warning" rationale
is the general, not specific knowledge of the offender.48 The issue is
not whether the offender knew that his conduct was prohibited but
whether he knew that his conduct was wrong.4 9
In Hollis v. Commonwealth,0 the defendant took his estranged
pregnant wife from her parent's home out to the barn and told her he
did not want the baby. He then forced his hand up her vagina killing
the child and substantially damaging the mother's uterus and vagina.5 1
The court found that he could not be charged with murder under a
statute penalizing "the death of another person." 2 How could Robert
Hollis not know that his conduct was wrong? As applied to the inten-
tional killing of an unborn child, the inquiry is whether the offender
had fair warning that he was killing a human being. 3
It will be immediately contended that the "Born Alive" Rule in-
dicates that the offender could not have known that he was killing a
human being.54 However, this argument is flawed for a two reasons.55
First, the definition of human being includes all human beings.5 6 The
Hollis baby was a viable, thirty-week old fetus which was proven by
the available evidence under the medical technology of this time5 7 A
viable fetus in a human mother is a human being. Second, the issue is
not whether Robert Hollis knew of the common law "Born Alive"
Rule that limited the scope of a homicide statute, but whether he
knew in ordinary everyday terms that he was killing a human being,
46. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 607-08.
47. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 611.
48. vAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 34
(1972).
49. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 611.
50. 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 611.
54. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 611.
55. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 611.
56. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 611.
57. Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
1995]
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his baby.58 In common knowledge, it is recognized that an unborn
child is a human being.59 Robert Hollis had fair knowledge that he
was killing a human being and the death of the unborn child should
not go unpunished due to the use of an antiquated law.
Another reason often cited by the courts for retaining the "Born
Alive" Rule is that the legislature has the primary right to define
crimes and their punishments, subject only to certain constitutional
limitations.60 Even when courts concede the inappropriateness of the
"born alive" requirement, they refuse to abandon it without express
legislative action.61
In People v. Guthrie,62 the defendant drove his pickup truck
across four lanes of traffic striking an automobile being driven by
Brenda Tucker in the northbound curb lane.63 The collision caused
Mrs. Tucker's abdomen to impact with her vehicle's steering wheel.64
At the time of the accident, Brenda Tucker was nine months pregnant
and was scheduled to enter the hospital the next day in preparation
for a caesarean delivery.65 Shortly after the accident, an emergency
caesarean section was performed and a stillborn infant was deliv-
ered.66 Both the pathologist and the obstetrician who performed the
caesarean stated that the infant had bled to death.67 Charges were
dismissed against the defendant on grounds that a fetus was not a
"person" within the meaning of the negligent homicide statute.68 In
Guthrie, the court termed the rule as "outmoded, archaic and no
longer serving a useful purpose," but refused to abandon the rule be-
cause the court would in effect be usurping the legislature's traditional
power of defining what acts should be criminal.69 Unfortunately,
many state legislatures have not utilized their police powers to protect
the potentiality of human life by deterring the conduct of those who
are acting intentionally against the unborn.
58. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 611.
59. Forsythe, supra note 15, at 611.
60. See, e.g., People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1980); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652
S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
61. Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potential-
ity of Human Life, 22 HtAv. J. ON LEGIs. 97, 131 (1985).
62. 293 N.W.2d 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), pet for leave to appeal denied, 334 N.W.2d 616
(Mich. 1983).
63. Id. at 776.
64. Id.
65. Id
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 778-81.
[Vol. 30:539
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The case of People v. Greer7° illustrates the failure of state legisla-
tures to extend adequate protection to the unborn fetus. In Greer, the
criminal defendant allegedly beat his pregnant girlfriend with his fists,
kicked her with his feet, struck her repeatedly with a broomstick
which broke during the course of the beating, and thereby caused the
death of an approximately eight-month-old fetus.71 Yet, that defend-
ant was found to be immune from prosecution under the state homi-
cide law.72 In this case, had the fetus been born alive and survived
independent of the mother for only a very short while, the prosecution
for homicide would have been permitted.73 The court's reliance on
the common-law rule would not have occurred had the legislature
protected potential human life by expressly including the fetus within
its murder statute.74
To avoid results such as that in Greer, some state legislatures have
announced statutory schemes that offer explicit measures of protec-
tion to the unborn from the nonconsensual killing of third parties
causing the termination of potential life.75 Some of these measures
70. 402 N.E.2d 203 (IM. 1980).
71. Id. at 206.
72. Id. at 209, 213.
73. Id. at 207; see also Parness, supra note 61, at 128.
74. Greer, 402 N.E.2d at 209; see also Parness, supra note 61, at 128.
75. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988) (defining homicide as "the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being, or a fetus"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 519-1.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(establishing the crime of "intentional homicide of an unborn child"); LA. REv. STAT. Ann.
§ 14:2(7) (West 1986) (defining person in criminal code to include human being from moment of
fertilization).
1995]
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are criminal abortion,7 6 feticide,77 and homicide78 statutes. In Califor-
nia, the "fetus" is protected within the murder statute.79 This protec-
tion came in response to Keeler v. Superior Court,80 in which the court
applied the "Born Alive" Rule. However, even if Keeler had been
tried in a state that protects fetuses through the criminal abortion
laws, he would not have been prosecuted for criminal abortion.81
Such laws differ from the California statute in that they only apply
where there are acts constituting an attempt at an "abortion."' Such
acts may not include all conduct directed at or causing a pregnancy
termination.8 3 In Keeler, the defendant was infuriated that his ex-wife
was pregnant.sa However, Keeler could not be prosecuted for crimi-
nal abortion because he only threw her against a car and shoved his
knee into her abdomen while stating, "I'm going to stomp it out of
you."8 5 His act could not be classified as an attempted abortion.86
Although beneficial, criminal abortion, feticide, and homicide
statutes leave gaps in criminal law regarding the unintentional conduct
of third parties.' Statutes expressly protective of potential life often
76. See, e.g., Mo. ANNr. STAT. § 188.030(1) (Vernon 1983) (defining an abortion as "the
intentional destruction of the life of an embryo or fetus in his or her mother's womb or the
intentional termination of the pregnancy of a mother with an intention other than to increase the
probability of a live birth or to remove a dead or dying unborn child"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720,
para. 510/2(4) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (defining an abortion as "the use of any instrument, medicine,
drug or any other substance or device to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be
pregnant with intent to cause fetal death"). Both the Missouri and Illinois criminal abortion
statutes require an intent to terminate potential human life.
77. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1993) ("Feticide-any person who intention-
ally terminates a human pregnancy after the end of the second trimester of the pregnancy where
death of the fetus results commits feticide."); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1992) (defining feticide
as the willful killing of a quickened child by an act injuring the mother that would be murder if
the mother died).
78. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00, 125.05 (McKinney 1987) (defining homicide to include cer-
tain abortional acts undertaken with the intent to cause a miscarriage); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187
(West 1988) (defining homicide as the unlawful killing of a human being, or fetus, with malice
aforethought).
79. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
80. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
81. Parness, supra note 61, at 135.
82. Parness, supra note 61, at 134.
83. Parness, supra note 61, at 134.
84. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 623.
85. Id. at 618; see also Parness supra note 61, at 135.
86. See Parness, supra note 61, at 135.
87. Parness, supra note 61, at 136.
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encompass only conduct undertaken with the intent to cause the ter-
mination of potential life or death.'n However, a wide range of culpa-
ble, but somewhat unintentional, third party conduct remains
unaddressed. 89 Because intent is a prerequisite in producing fetal
death for these statutes, what happens in the case of an intoxicated
motorist who operates a car, causing a collision and causes the death
of an unborn child?9° Though the fetus is killed, the driver cannot be
prosecuted for the fetus's death because there was no intentional kill-
ing of the fetus.91 Similarly, although a mugger or rapist intentionally
inflicts injury upon a pregnant woman, he usually cannot be prose-
cuted for the ensuing death of the fetus if he is unaware of the preg-
nancy; he has not "willfully" killed the unborn child as is often
required.9 So, criminal laws especially protective of the unborn are
certainly lacking. Even when states act expressly to protect fetuses
through their criminal laws, perhaps in response to judicial criticism of
the "Born Alive" Rule, their legislative protection is often
incomplete.93
Despite retaining the "Born Alive" Rule, many states have recog-
nized that an unborn child is in existence from the moment of concep-
tion and its existence is recognized by the law for purposes in equity,
property law, and tort law.94 Until the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, civil common law denied recovery for wrongful death actions
based on the stillbirth of a child due to injuries to the mother. In
Verkennes v. Corniea,96 the Supreme Court of Minnesota became the
first court to assail this policy when it allowed the plaintiff-father's
88. See, eg., Mo. ANti. STAT. §188.030(1) (Vernon 1983) (defining an abortion as "the in-
tentional destruction of the life of an embryo or fetus in his or her mother's womb or the inten-
tional termination of the pregnancy of a mother with an intention other than to increase the
probability of a live birth or to remove a dead or dying unborn child."); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 707.7 (West 1993) ("Feticide-any person who intentionally terminates a human pregnancy
after the end of the second trimester of the pregnancy where death of the fetus results commits
feticide."); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00, 125.05 (McKinney 1987) (including in the definition of
homicide certain abortional acts undertaken with the intent to cause a miscarriage).
89. Parness, supra note 61, at 136.
90. Parness, supra note 61, at 137.
91. Parness, supra note 61, at 137.
92. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1992) (defining feticide as the willful killing of a
quickened child by an act injuring the mother that would be murder if the mother died).
93. Parness, supra note 61, at 137 n.177.
94. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 367-68.
95. See, &g., Newman v. City of Detroit, 274 N.W. 710 (Mich. 1937); Buel v. United Rail-
ways Co., 154 S.W. 71 (Mo. 1913); Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2d 944
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
96. 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
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wrongful death action against a physician for allegedly negligent con-
duct which caused a stillbirth.97
A majority of jurisdictions now recognize a wrongful death action
based on the death of an unborn child.98 In doing so, courts construe
the terms "person" or "human being" in the various wrongful death
statutes to include a viable fetus, thereby entitling the unborn to the
same protection afforded the born.99 If a viable unborn child is killed,
the estate may sue for monetary damages from the wrong-doer.100
However, if the same child is killed under circumstances which would
constitute murder or manslaughter, but for the fact that the child is
still in his mother's womb, the wrong-doer is immune from criminal
prosecution for the intentional killing.101 It is inconsistent to declare
that "an action may be maintained by the personal representative of a
viable unborn child for the wrongful death of such child" and yet, not
recognize the death of such child in the context of criminal
prosecution.102
V. COMPARATIVE LAW OF OTHER STATES
As indicated in the introduction, two courts besides Oklahoma
have found it within their powers of judicial interpretation to recog-
nize feticide by expressly altering the common law "Born Alive" Rule.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Cass03 con-
cluded that the term "person" as used in the vehicular homicide stat-
ute included viable fetuses." 4 A similar opinion was issued the next
day1"5 by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in State v. Home,10 6
where the court found that an action for homicide based on the killing
of an unborn child could be maintained1 °7 The only basis given for
this decision was the court's right and duty to develop the common
law of South Carolina.108
97. 1& at 841.
98. See Lingle, supra note 7, at 466 n.6.
99. See, eg., DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489,493 (N.C. 1987); Verkennes v. Corniea,
38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Minn. 1949). For a complete list of cases construing wrongful death statutes
to include viable fetuses, see Lingle, supra note 7, at 466 n.6.
100. KEON ETr AL, supra note 7, at 367-68.
101. Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 429-30 (W. Va. 1971).
102. Id. at 436.
103. 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984).
104. Id. at 1330.
105. The Massachusetts decision was issued on August 16,1984 and the South Carolina opin-
ion on August 17, 1984.
106. 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
107. Id. at 704.
108. Id.
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A. Massachusetts
In Commonwealth v. Cass, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts had before it a statute which provided that whoever operates
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
marihuana, etc., and causes the death of another "person," shall be
guilty of "homicide by a motor vehicle."'0 9 The defendant, while driv-
ing a motor vehicle, struck a pregnant female pedestrian and caused
the death of the pedestrian's viable fetus.110
The court in Cass held that a viable fetus is a "person" under the
statute in question."' In so holding, the court rejected the assertion
that it was unable to develop common law rules of criminal law where
the legislature had promulgated criminal law statutes." 2 The court
also rejected the assertion that, by using the term "person" in the ve-
hicular homicide statute, the legislature intended to crystallize the
preexisting, limited definition of "person" at common law."13 Finally,
the court concluded that the rule of strict construction of criminal stat-
utes did not prevent the court from construing the word "person" to
include viable fetuses." 4 The court stated:
We think that the better rule is that infliction of prenatal injuries
resulting in the death of a viable fetus, before or after it is born, is
homicide. If a person were to commit violence against a pregnant
woman and destroy the fetus within her, we would not want the
death of the fetus to go unpunished. We believe that our criminal
law should extend its protection to viable fetuses.
15
B. South Carolina
The decision of the court in Cass, however, does not stand alone.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Home held that an ac-
tion for criminal homicide could be maintained for the death of a via-
ble unborn child.116 The court applied the state homicide statute to a
stillborn child, implicitly acknowledging the "Born Alive" Rule to be
evidentiary in nature. 17 The court in Home stated, "[t]he fact this
particular issue has not been raised or ruled on before does not mean
109. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1330.
112. Id. at 1327.
113. Id.
114. I&
115. I. at 1329.
116. State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984).
117. Id. at 703.
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we are prevented from declaring the common law as it should be."1183
The Home court, like the Cass court, rejected the "Born Alive" Rule
but ruled that application of the homicide statute to the killing of an
unborn child would be prospective. 119
VI. HUcHEs v. STATE
A. Facts and Procedural Background
In August of 1990, the defendant, Treva LaNan Hughes, while
driving under the influence of alcohol, collided with another automo-
bile driven by Reesa Poole who was nine months pregnant and ex-
pected to deliver in four days.1 20 Due to the collision, the steering
wheel in Poole's car broke because Poole's stomach hit the steering
wheel with such force.' 21 After the accident, the baby was born by an
emergency caesarean section and the only sign of life was an ex-
tremely slow heartbeat."2 It was, however, brain dead and had no
blood pressure, no respiration and did not respond to any resuscitative
efforts. 23 Medical evidence determined that the fetus was viable at
the time of the accident, and that it had died as a result of the placen-
tal obreption which occurred when Poole's stomach hit and broke the
steering wheel of her car.124
Hughes was charged with manslaughter of the unborn fetus.' 25
Since the only matter for decision in the case was the legal issue of
whether the conviction should be reversed on the basis of the common
law "Born Alive" Rule, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals or-
dered a direct review.' 26 Applying its decision prospectively, the court
held that a viable fetus is a "human being" which may be the subject
of a homicide under title 21, section 691 of the Oklahoma Statutes 27
and the common law "Born Alive" Rule is abandoned."2
118. Id. at 704.
119. Id.
120. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 731 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id at 732.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 731. Oklahoma's first degree manslaughter statute, provides that "[h]omicide is
manslaughter in the first degree... [w]hen perpetrated without a design to effect death by a
person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor." OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 711(1)
(1991).
126. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 731.
127. Id. Oklahoma's homicide statute provides that "[h]omicide is the killing of one human
being by another." OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §691 (1991).
128. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 731.
[Vol. 30:539
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B. The Majority Opinion
The issue in Hughes was one of first impression in Oklahoma. 29
Certain of the undesirability of allowing the commission of violence
against a pregnant woman resulting in the death of her unborn child
to go unpunished, or to be punished as less than homicide, the court
extended the protection of the criminal law to viable fetuses, subject
to the constitutional limits imposed by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade.130
The court set forth several reasons for its holding. The first rea-
son was based upon the origins, history, and purpose of the "Born
Alive" Rule.' 3' The court rejected the Rule as no longer relevant in
the twentieth century in view of modern medical advances. 32 The
court reasoned that concerns about whether the fetus was alive at the
time of the defendant's act are no longer valid. 33 The court con-
cluded that speculation as to causation can be removed through com-
petent medical testimony.13 4
In addition, the court analogized to the decisions of Cass and
Home. 35 In those two cases, both courts felt that they had the right
and the duty to develop the common law to better serve an ever-
changing society as a whole.'36 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals stated that they also had the right and duty to develop the com-
mon law of Oklahoma to serve the evolving needs of its citizens. 37
Another reason was based on the plain language and purpose in
using the words "human being" in the homicide statute. 38 The court
stated that the purpose of the Oklahoma Statutes title 21, section 691
is to protect human life.' 39 A viable human fetus is nothing less than
129. Id. at 731.
130. Id. at 734. The court stated:
We wish to make it absolutely clear that our holding shall not affect a woman's consti-
tutional right to choose a lawful abortion based upon her constitutional right to privacy
or a physician's right to perform one .... Accordingly, today's decision to bestow upon
viable human fetuses the legal status of "human being" under Oklahoma law, cannot
and shall not be used as the basis for bringing homicide charges against either a woman
who chooses a lawful abortion or a physician who performs a lawful abortion.
Id. at 734-35 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 732.
132. IM.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 732-33.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 733.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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human life. 4 ' Thus, the term "human being" in section 691, accord-
ing to its plain and ordinary meaning, includes a viable human fe-
tus.141 The court went on further to overrule State v. Harbert,'42 in
which the same court held that a viable fetus is not a "person" within
the meaning of the Oklahoma Statutes title 21, section 652, an assault
and battery statute. 43
The court also looked at Oklahoma's bifurcated appellate system;
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has final jurisdiction over civil appeals,
and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has final jurisdiction
over criminal appeals."4 The court stated that while neither
Oklahoma court is obligated to adopt the reasoning of the other, con-
sistency is certainly desirable.' 45 The court looked to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's holding in Evans v. Olson,46 in which it had decided
that a statutory cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn
viable child exists under title 12, section 1053 of the Oklahoma Stat-
utes.'4 7 The court reasoned that the decision of Evans further sup-
ported its rationale for including a viable human fetus in the term
"human being."'1 48
The Hughes court went on to state that the legislative intent is not
changed by this decision. 49 The change comes in the common law as
applied in this jurisdiction so as to more fully adapt to present day
life.'50 The homicide statute was enacted to protect human life.15'
The court concluded, therefore, that the legislature intended to in-
clude a viable fetus as a person protected under the homicide statute
and is clearly in accord with legislative intent.' 52 Finally, the court
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 758 P.2d 826 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)
143. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 733 (citing State v. Harbert, 758 P.2d 826 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 550 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Okla. 1976).
147. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 733 (citing Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Okla. 1976)). The
statute provides in part:
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the per-
sonal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, or
his personal representative if he is also deceased, if the former might have maintained
an action had he lived, against the latter, or his representative, for an injury for the
same act or omission.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §1053(A) (1991).
148. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 733.
149. Id. at 734.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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also found that the holding satisfied the constitutional requirement of
notice and fairness to the defendant by making the decision
prospective. 3
C. The Dissent
Presiding Judge Lumpkin concurred in part and dissented in part.
He concurred with the court's determination that the term "human
being" includes a viable human fetus pursuant to title 21, section 691
of the Oklahoma Statutes.' 54 His dissent was based on the court's de-
cision that the judgment and sentence for first degree manslaughter
must be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss.' 55 He
stated two reasons for his dissenting opinion. 6 The first reason is
that the court, in effect, recognizes the "Born Alive" Rule to be evi-
dentiary, not substantive, in nature.' 5 The court cites title 12, section
2 of the Oklahoma Statutes for the legal principle that the common
law is applicable in Oklahoma.' 58 The title of this section actually re-
fers to the code of civil procedure and section 9 provides for the code
of criminal procedure.5 9 Judge Lumpkin states that there are no
common law crimes in this state as is made clear by title 12, section 2
of the Oklahoma Statutes. 60 Therefore, the application of the homi-
cide statute is an application of a substantive criminal statute which
was originally codified in 1910.161 In conclusion, the discussion re-
garding retroactivity and foreseeability are therefore inappropriate
and inapplicable. 62
Presiding Judge Lumpkin's second reason for dissenting was
based on the determination that the child was dead upon delivery.'
63
He states that in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that a
baby who had a heartbeat before and after delivery, and who was not
pronounced dead until over an hour after delivery, was alive.' 4 His
reasoning is based on the legislature's definition of "live birth" as it is
153. Id. at 735.
154. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 736 (OkIa. Crim. App. 1994).
155. Id.
156. Id
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Ld.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. IL at 737.
164. 1&
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used in connection with vital statistics governing birth and death.1 65
Based on this "live birth," the defendant should be convicted of man-
slaughter. 166 The majority, however, held that being brain dead is the
fact which determines whether there has been a "live birth" or not
and in this case, the child was brain dead, therefore never being born
alive.167
VII. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HuGHES
The Hughes decision is momentous because the court viewed its
role not only as interpreting but also as developing the criminal law. 168
Assured of its authority to decide the issue at bar, the Hughes court
deliberated whether it should follow the common law definition of
homicide. 69 The rationale offered for retaining the "Born Alive"
Rule was discarded by the court as unpersuasive because advances in
medical technology can provide competent proof of fetal viability at
the time of the defendant's conduct, and can prove whether the de-
fendant's conduct caused the death.'70 Recognizing the constitutional
limitations with respect to an individual's right to privacy, the Hughes
court extended the criminal law to protect viable fetuses, and thus
held that a viable fetus, before or after birth, is a "person" under the
Oklahoma homicide statute.' 7'
The Hughes court boldly rejected firmly rooted precedent and
justified its approach to the judicial construction of the homicide stat-
ute and its rejection of the principle that the court is bound by the pre-
existing common law definition of human being. 72 While the rule of
strictly construing criminal statutes is crucial in assuring fairness to the
defendant, the courts must nevertheless construe them with regard to
the evil which they are intended to suppress. 73 Society would not
want such a crime to go unpunished. The Hughes court also satisfied
the due process requirement of providing adequate notice of potential
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 732.
168. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 733 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
169. Id. at 731-33.
170. Id at 732.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 731-33.
173. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 632 (Cal. 1970).
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criminal behavior and avoided unfairness to Treva Hughes by apply-
ing its decision prospectively.174 Thus, the Hughes court rejected con-
cerns of the judiciary overstepping its power, and stated precedent
and the elasticity of common law as support.'"
The personhood of the fetus was the major obstacle confronting
the Hughes court. 7 6 The court persuasively dispelled the reasoning
behind the "Born Alive" Rule, emphasizing that current scientific un-
derstanding has eliminated the problem of proving that the fetus was
alive and that the defendant's conduct had caused its death. 77 Addi-
tionally, the court noted the trend toward allowing recovery for an
unborn fetus under civil wrongful death statutes and effectively analo-
gized the decision in Evans to the instant case. 78 Thus, the court logi-
cally concluded that the time had come to dispense with the "Born
Alive" Rule in construing whether a fetus is a "person" under criminal
homicide statutes. 79
Notwithstanding its positive impact on the legal status of a viable
fetus with regard to homicide statutes, the Hughes decision may have
overtones in the area of a woman's right to privacy and freedom of
choice.'80 The court carefully warned, however, that its decision
should not infringe on a woman's constitutional right to privacy.' 8'
The Hughes decision defines who is entitled to legal protection under
the Oklahoma homicide statute. 82 To ensure that a woman's consti-
tutional right to privacy is preserved, the Hughes holding should be
limited to this narrow area.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Hughes decision represents a divergence from strong prece-
dent. The court reexamined the rationales behind the stringent com-
mon law standard of refusing to include viable fetuses within the
meaning of the word "person" for purposes of homicide statutes, and
logically concluded that the "Born Alive" Rule was outmoded. A de-
fendant can now be charged with and convicted of the murder of a
viable fetus. The Hughes decision effectively paves the way for other
174. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 735.
175. Id. at 732-35.
176. Id. at 731.
177. lId at 732.
178. Id. at 733.
179. L at 731.
180. Id. at 734.
181. lML
182. lId
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courts to afford legal protection for the destruction of viable fetuses.
Justice is now adequately served when an unborn viable baby can be
killed by a non-consensual act with the offender being seriously pun-
ished and stigmatized for committing the crime. If kept within the
narrow context of defining who is entitled to legal protection under
homicide statutes, the Hughes decision does not infringe on the
Supreme Court's determination that a woman has the constitutional
right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.
Mary Lynn Kime
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